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VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN TEXAS
REVISITED-A PLEA FOR ITS ABOLITION
by
J. H. Edgar, Jr.*
U NTIL a few years ago, many Texas lawyers erroneously believed that
a "slip and fall" case was relatively easy to prepare and try. If the de-
fendant knew of the dangerous condition on the floor or if it had been there
so long that the defendant should have known of it, the plaintiff was entitled
to have the primary negligence and causation issues submitted to the jury, to
be followed by issues of contributory negligence.' The law has advanced and,
unfortunately, become more complex. The "slip and fall" case in Texas is no
longer simple. In addition to negativing "no duty," plaintiff must be found not
to have either expressly or impliedly voluntarily assumed the risk. Only
then may the jury consider the questions of primary and contributory negli-
gence. Putting aside the nightmare of special issue submission which, at least
for the time being, has been standardized and, hopefully, simplified by Adam
Dante Corp. v. Sharpe,' the substantive tort questions remain. How did volun-
tary assumption of risk evolve in Texas? Why do we have the doctrine? Is it
sound tort theory in all cases, some cases, or none? Are there reasonable
alternatives?
Consent or assent is the cornerstone of volenti non fit injurias or voluntary
assumption of risk." However, the early concept of consent appears to have
undergone radical transformation when compared to its present application in
Texas negligence law. Originally, when the plaintiff expressly consented to
the risk of harm, the defendant prevailed because he had committed no wrong.
The defendant's conduct was privileged and, therefore, he never became a
torrfeasor. In the area of intentional torts, the patient's consent to the surgeon's
operation rendered the surgeon's conduct privileged. The reason the surgeon
did not commit a battery was that the consent obtained before surgery
prevented him from becoming a tortfeasor. At common law one was free to
do as he pleased with his person and property. If he consented to their appro-
0 B.A., Texas A. & M. University; LL.B., University of Texas. Associate Professor of
Law, Texas Tech University.
'See generally 40 TEx. JUR. 2D Negligence S 72, at 564 (1971), and the many cases
there cited.
5483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972).
'Dee v. Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 174, 327 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1959).
'As used in this Article, the term voluntary assumption of risk is the same doctrine that
was called volenti non fit injuria prior to Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452
(Tex. 1972), and is not necessarily the assumed risk doctrine that arose from the master-
servant cases. For a discussion of this area, members of the Texas bar will be particularly
interested in reviewing Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REv. 77 (1961);
Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1 (1966); Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR
L. REV. 111 (1964); P. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV.
108 (1961); P. Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions-
Special Issue Submission in Texas, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1954); P. Keeton, Personal In-
juries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 PA. L. REV. 629 (1952); R. Kee-
ton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961); Mans-
field, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17 (1961); Pedrick, Taken for
a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 90 (1961); Wade,
The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, Explanatory Notes S 893, at 72-87 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1963), for a broad discussion of this general area.
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priation or abuse by others, no tort was committed. This principle was recog-
nized in McCue v. Klein: "As a general principle, a man can recover no
damages for an injury received at the hands of another, with his own consent,
unless it arises from some act which is in itself a breach of the peace. '
Thus, a female over the age of eighteen years cannot recover civil damages
for rape if she has consented. The defendant does not commit rape-he does
not become a tortfeasor.' An occupant's consent to entry constitutes a privi-
lege in a suit for trespass to land' or personalty.8 Likewise, one who consents
to the creation of a nuisance cannot successfully maintain a cause of action
against those to whom consent was given because of the privilege afforded to
what would otherwise be antisocial, tortious conduct.!
These intentional tort cases involve express consent. The defendant intends
the consequences of the act which results in the harm and the plaintiff consents
prior to the act. However, negligence law involves unintentional harms and
regards fault, or antisocial conduct, as the basis of liability."0 One reason why
there are very few negligence cases in which the plaintiff expressly consents
to the injury is that the defendant does not intend the consequences of his
act. The defendant often creates an unreasonable risk of harm (thus violating
a duty of ordinary care to the plaintiff) long before the victim becomes aware
of, let alone consents to, the risk of harm.
On the other hand, if the defendant is induced to act or creates a risk of
harm on the reasonable belief that the plaintiff is willing to accept it, whether
plaintiff is actually willing or not, then the defendant acted reasonably." In
other words, the defendant is not negligent, either as a matter of law or fact.
Some courts, however, would say that the plaintiff consented to the risk by
implication (implied voluntary assumption of risk) or that the defendant
owed the plaintiff no duty. This Article will attempt to expose the fallacy of
this reasoning and suggest a logical alternative to the use of the "no duty" and
assumption of risk analyses.
I. McKEE V. PATTERSON
McKee v. Patterson" is the pivotal case in this area. The plaintiff, an em-
ployee of a subcontractor in charge of installing gymnasium partitions and
bleachers, slipped and fell from a ladder on a slick floor. The defendant, the
general contractor, was responsible for the slick floor because of the time
sequence in which he scheduled the work. Both the defendant and plaintiff
'60 Tex. 168 (1883); cf. Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48
S.W. 563 (1898); Perkins v. Nail, 37 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931),
error retf.
'Cf. Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966); Maler
v. Hill, 285 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926); Altman v. Eckermann, 132
S.W. 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).7 Gorman v. Brazelton, 168 S.W. 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1914).
'Temple v. Duran, 121 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
'Crawford v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 62 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1933).
"OW. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 17-19 (4th ed. 1971); BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 738
(rev. 4th ed. 1968); Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 368
(1956).
"Se Mansfield, supra note 4, at 25.
"2 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
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knew and appreciated the hazard created by the floor in advance of the plain-
tiff's labor.
The Texas Supreme Court had several options available in analyzing these
facts. The choices it made provide a foundation for the doctrinal difficulties
encountered today. For example, the court equated the duty of a general con-
tractor with the duty of a landowner 3 to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition or to warn of dangers that are not open and obvious. The court
failed to recognize that the policies that protect a general contractor are
materially different from those protecting the landowner. The nature of the
work and the activity of construction create hazardous conditions in themselves.
In the usual sense, such is not the case with the landowner. Further, while it
might be argued that the landowner intends to withhold entry unless the
plaintiff expressly agrees to encounter the risk of harm, the thought of with-
holding entry to a subcontractor's employee absent express assumption of risk
is far from the contractor's mind. If the court had recognized the general con-
tractor's duty as simply "to provide a reasonably safe place to work," the
volenti problem created by the alternate duty "to warn" would not have arisen.
The court apparently felt that the general contractor's duty to the plaintiff
could have been fulfilled by warning plaintiff of the dangerous condition, and
since plaintiff was aware of the dangerous condition, this duty had been ful-
filled. As will be stated later, a duty to warn should not necessarily be co-
extensive with the possessor's duty to maintain reasonably safe premises. The
duty to warn should be one of the possessor's duties, but even if fulfilled,
should not automatically free him from his general and larger duty of ordinary
care.
The court's decision to analyze and handle premises cases on the basis of
"no duty" to warn of open and obvious dangers and volenti, in addition to
contributory negligence, instead of the conventional "primary/contributory
negligence" formula, means that fault is not the sole basis for gauging the
plaintiff's conduct." If fault determines the defendant's liability in a negligence
case, the same standard, measured by plaintiff's contributory fault, should be
required to exonerate the defendant.
Finally, relying upon old English and American cases which refused to
recognize that economic as well as other forms of coercion are socially justi-
fiable and acceptable reasons for excusing the plaintiff's conduct, the court
concluded that plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk as a matter of law.
In making this decision, a substantial body of Texas law was rejected.5
In spite of the above comments, no criticism is directed to the result the
"This equation has already been sufficiently criticized. See Green, supra note 4, at 84.
'Voluntary assumption of risk, unfortunately, has now spilled over into the "non-
premises" cases and constitutes a valid defense even though the plaintiff was not con-
tributorily negligent. Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1971) (deceased killed
when butane ignited); J. & W. Corp. v. Ball, 414 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1967) (plaintiff
injured while assisting defendant's employee in placing wheel of truck-tractor on block);
Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1966) (plaintiff injured on defendant's defective
tractor); Texas Bitulithic Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 357 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1962), error ref. m.r.e. (defectively designed maintainer); Kirby Lumber Corp. v.
Murphy, 271 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1954) (defendant negligently
placed logs on plaintiff's truck).
15See text accompanying notes 21-29 infra.
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court reached. There are many types of hazards which are an inherent part of
the work on the premises. It would not do violence to the court's role in the
administration of justice to recognize, considering the construction activity
underway in McKee, that the defendant did not maintain an unreasonably
dangerous condition or that the defendant was reasonable in believing that the
plaintiff was willing to accept the risk. In other words, the defendant was not
negligent as a matter of law.1" Or, if the court concluded that there was evidence
of defendant's negligence, it could have absolved the defendant of liability by
holding (though probably not warranted by the facts) that the plaintiff's con-
duct constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law.17
The path chosen in McKee is unfortunate. In essence, the court denied re-
covery to a non-negligent plaintiff even though the defendant was negli-
gent. Contrary to the concept that fault is the basis of negligence law, the
defendant prevailed on a theory that has its roots in the privilege of consent-
not express consent, but implied consent. The two concepts are totally differ-
ent, however, and the method adopted by the court neither clarified nor
simplified this body of the law. To the contrary, it has been a source of con-
stant confusion.
Five fact patterns will illustrate the resulting problems: (1) Assume that
the defendant landowner creates or maintains a dangerous condition on the
land. A business invitee enters and is injured by it. Since the defendant created
a risk of harm toward one to whom he owed a duty of ordinary care, the
creation or maintenance of that risk constituted a breach of that duty. Without
any additional facts, defendant was negligent. He owed the plaintiff a duty to
keep the premises reasonably safe and breached that duty.
(2) Now suppose that after entry, the plaintiff observes the dangerous
condition, appreciates its danger and voluntarily encounters it, or (3) observes
the condition but really does not think of the danger it presents one way or
the other until after injury. Are either of these voluntary assumption of risk
or "no duty" cases? With respect to the "no duty" argument, it has been
established that the defendant breached his duty to the plaintiff by not keeping
the premises reasonably safe or warning the plaintiff of the danger. The de-
fendant has done nothing to change his duty to "no duty." The law should
not excuse the defendant's conduct by saying that he owed the plaintiff "no
duty" when, in fact, he not only owed the plaintiff a duty, but violated it prior
to plaintiff's injury. Likewise, with voluntary assumption of risk, which has
its genesis in consent or assent to injury, one cannot seriously say that the
defendant was not negligent. Since the defendant was negligent and the
plaintiff has not, in fact, consented to being hurt, defendant's conduct has
'See, e.g., Genell Inc. v. Flynn, 358 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1962). Such analysis would
more properly explain the results of McNiel v. Fort Worth Baseball Club, 268 S.W.2d 244
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954), error ref., and Knebel v. Jones, 266 S.W.2d 470
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954), error ref. n.r.e., in which spectators were injured by a
baseball. Either the risk of harm was not unreasonable or the defendant reasonably believed
the plaintiff was willing to accept the risk-defendant was simply not negligent as a matter
of law, although McNiel was decided on assumed risk and Knebel on a combination of no
primary negligence and contributory negligence as a matter of law.
"'Sargent v. Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S.W.2d 787 (1953), is the last case in which
the court denied liability to an invitee on the basis of contributory negligence apart from
."no duty," volenti non fit injuria, or voluntary assumption of risk.
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not become privileged. To say that plaintiff is willing to encounter a danger
is entirely different from saying that he consents to the injury resulting from
it. It cannot be said, with intellectual honesty, that defendant owed plaintiff
"no duty," or that plaintiff consented or assented to the injury. The most that
can be said is that plaintiff acted unreasonably. He may be contributorily
negligent, either in law or in fact.
(4) Plaintiff never has been told by defendant of, nor does he observe, the
unreasonably dangerous condition until after injury, although he has repeatedly
exposed himself to it. The defendant was negligent and the "no duty" concept
should be unavailable. Since plaintiff never observed the dangerous condition,
he could not have consented to the injury resulting from its existence. Thus,
contributory negligence is the only sensible negligence doctrine available to
bar his recovery.
(5) Defendant maintains or creates a dangerous condition on the land
but warns the plaintiff prior to entry and plaintiff is willing to enter in spite
of it. Should a proper decision rest upon "no duty," no primary negligence
as a matter of law, or consent to the risk? To answer the "no duty" question,
the extent of the defendant's duty must be understood. Is it the duty to main-
tain reasonably safe premises, which includes the duty to warn, or is it a duty
to maintain reasonably safe premises or to warn of dangers neither open nor
obvious? In other words, should defendant's duty to exercise ordinary care be
fulfilled or extinguished once he has warned the plaintiff?18 It is submitted that
it should not. The law should impose upon the defendant the broad duty of
maintaining reasonably safe premises, including many smaller duties, one of
which is the duty to warn."9 The law should impose upon the defendant a
continuing duty to maintain reasonably safe premises because it comports with
desirable conduct in modern society.
One could say that the defendant, by giving warning prior to plaintiff's
entry, acted reasonably, and consequently was not guilty of antisocial conduct.
However, since he maintained a dangerous condition which is not socially
desirable, it seems more realistic to say that the plaintiff, after being warned
of the danger by the defendant, expressly (not impliedly) consented to the
risk of harm created by the defendant. This is the heart of the doctrine of
consent, because the defendant commits himself to a certain course of conduct
when the plaintiff indicates a willingness to accept the defendant's risk of
harm." Once the defendant warns the plaintiff, who then assents to the risk
18 Compare Triangle Motors v. Richfield, 152 Tex. 354, 358, 258 S.W.2d 60, 62 (1953)
("[A) duty to use reasonable care to make or keep the premises reasonably safe for [plain-
tiff's] use, including the duty to warn him of dangers which were not obvious, reasonably
apparent or as well known to the plaintiff as they were to the defendant."), with Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1963) ("[A] duty to use or-
dinary care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition for his invitees or to warn.").
Note that the duty to warn is given much greater dignity in the latter quotation than the
former.9 Triangle Motors v. Richfield, 152 Tex. 354, 358, 258 S.W.2d 60, 62 (1953). On
the other hand, if plaintiff's only theory of liability is the defendant's failure to warn, then
such warning, once given, may fulfill the defendant's duty under some circumstances. See
Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
2°The defendant's commitment may also arise as a result of a contract with plaintiff
(contractual assumption of risk) or by legislative edict (workmen's compensation insurance
statutes and FELA, for example).
19721
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of harm, the defendant has relieved himself of any antisocial conduct. He is
not negligent solely due to plaintiff's consent. If, on the other hand, the plain-
tiff manifests an unwillingness to accept the risk, the defendant is still in
control of the situation and has the right to refuse plaintiff admission to the
premises if he desires.
Prior to the decision in McKee, a substantial body of precedent had decided
such cases on the traditional, simple, and sound principles of primary and
contributory negligence. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Gascamp" was the earliest of
such decisions. Defendant maintained its bridge at a point where its track
crossed a public road. Because of defendant's negligence in failing to keep
the bridge in repair, plaintiff's horse threw and injured him. Plaintiff knew that
the bridge was in disrepair and dangerous but, by way of justification, plaintiff
testified that the public road was the only one between his home and destina-
tion. In writing the opinion, Judge Gaines did not refer to assumption of risk
or no duty, and the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed upon a
traditional analysis of primary and contributory negligence. In modern par-
lance, the court could have said that the defendant had a duty to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of dangers not open and
obvious, but since plaintiff knew of and voluntarily encountered the danger, he
was barred by failing to negative "no duty" and voluntary assumption of
risk.2" The court, however, used simple doctrines to handle a simple case.
Sophistication was not required to determine that the defendant breached its
duty to keep the bridge in reasonable repair and that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that plaintiff was free of contributory
negligence.
In McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp."' the plaintiff, while working on his em-
ployer's premises, went to a location near the property line to point out to
defendant's employee a location where defendant's pipe line had been leaking
for many months. Defendant's employee struck a match to light a cigarette,
which caused the natural gas to explode and injure plaintiff. Since plaintiff
was aware of the dangerous condition (the escaping gas), would current Texas
practice require a directed verdict for defendant upon the theory that plaintiff
failed to negate "no duty" since the dangerous condition was open and obvious,
in spite of the fact that the defendant had negligently maintained it for two
years, thus breaching its duty during that entire period? 4 Fortunately, the
2169 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888).
2 Would the present court reject plaintiff's contention that the encounter was not vol-
untary on the basis that he had the alternate choices of staying at home or crossing private
lands to reach his destination? Cf. Greenwood v. Lowe Chem. Co., 433 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.
1968) (per curiam); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex.
1963); McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 526, 271 S.W.2d 391, 397 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
23137 Tex. 314, 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941).
24 See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. 1972), in which the
court stated: "A plaintiff . . . may be charged in law with knowledge and appreciation
of a dangerous condition if the condition is open and obvious to her. A defendant, there-
fore, owes no duty as to conditions which are open and obvious." See also Methodist Hosp.
v. Hudson, 465 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), error ref.
n.r.e.; Gulfway Gen. Hosp. v. Pursley, 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965),
e ror ref. in.r.e.
[Vol. 26
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court at that time was able to base its decision on the primary/contributory
negligence formula.
Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers' is another example of how nicely the
simple negligence formula works. Plaintiff, an elderly lady, had twice earlier
on the day of the accident taken a seat at defendant's soda fountain. At the
time of the accident, she was removing herself from the seat but forgot that
the seat was affixed to a platform nine inches above the level of the floor. The
court did not confuse the issue by resorting to the perplexing, baffling, con-
fusing doctrinal quagmire of negating "no duty," "open and obvious," and
voluntary assumption of risk. After reviewing the evidence, it concluded that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine defendant's negligence
and lack of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Admittedly, such a method of
analysis requires the court to deal with each case on its own facts. Each duty
question must be determined between the precise parties and the risk of harm
under consideration. These are close, hard questions, but it is the function of
the court to come to grips with and answer them."8 Given a different, though
somewhat analagous set of facts, the court might have charged the plaintiff
with contributory negligence as a matter of law. For example, had plaintiff
been an agile young woman who had or should have paid attention to the steps
on the prior occasions or, as the plaintiff in Wesson v. Gillespie,7 been a daily
visitor over a long period, a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of
law might have been justified.
The case for contributory negligence is well stated in Northcutt v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co.," in which the jury found that plaintiff "knew or should have
known" of the defect. No subsidiary issues on negligence or proximate cause
were submitted. After first recognizing that liability is based on fault, the court
observed:
If it be conceded that under the first phase of the finding the plaintiff had
such knowledge [actual knowledge] or under the second phase of the same
he had, as a matter of law, constructive notice of said fact [imputed knowledge
as a matter of law], the finding had no further effect or importance. The
material consideration under the circumstances would not be what the plaintiff
knew as a disconnected fact, but what an ordinarily prudent person, having
such knowledge, would have done or omitted to do under the circumstances."8
Prior to the implementation of the concepts which require negating "no
duty" ° and whether plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk, the court never
25 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941).
2 0See Lang v. Henderson, 147 Tex. 353, 215 S.W.2d 585 (1948), in which plaintiffs
were tenants in defendant's building and smelled gas from a defective hot water heater for
several months before a fire resulted from the defect. Plaintiff was employed half-time while
attending school, his wife was six months pregnant, and there was an acute housing shortage.
Plaintiff had called the condition to defendant's attention several times prior to the fire, but
defendant had failed to repair it. The court held that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. See also Hall v. Medical Bldg., 151 Tex. 425, 251 S.W.2d 497 (1952);
Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1951); J. Weingarten Inc.
v. Brockman, 134 Tex. 451, 135 S.W.2d 698 (1940).
27382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964).
* 90 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935), error ref.9Id. at 635.
"°Not to be confused with negativing "no duty" in this area are those cases in which
the defendant's duty does not extend to a particular plaintiff for the risk of harm under
1972]
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hesitated to hold that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law if it concluded that reasonable minds could not differ on the point. United
Gas Corp. v. Crawford1 is an example of such a case. Plaintiff, a city em-
ployee, fell into an open ditch that the defendant had excavated to lower its
lines so the city could lower the street's grade. The court first examined the
defendant's duty to maintain the excavation in reasonably safe condition and
determined that its failure to brace the walls was a breach of that duty which
caused plaintiff's injury. The court next looked to plaintiff's conduct and found
that he failed, as a matter of law, either to maintain a proper lookout for his
own safety or otherwise take reasonable precautions. Plaintiff's knowledge and
appreciation of the dangerous condition that contributed to his injuries were
thoroughly discussed and analyzed as they pertained to whether he was con-
tributorily negligent. The court would not condone plaintiff's conduct because
he was at fault. To determine whether the condition was open and obvious, or
whether plaintiff negated "no duty," or voluntarily assumed the risk, in law or
in fact, was unnecessary. Plaintiff's conduct was judged by the same standard
as defendant's, i.e., that of a reasonably prudent person, and found lacking."2
McKee," however, relied primarily upon five decisions to support its con-
clusion that plaintiff's knowledge, appreciation, and voluntary encounter ex-
tinguished the defendant's alternate duty to warn. In Houston National Bank
v. Adair,' most often cited as an "open and obvious" or "no duty" case, plain-
tiff was injured by falling on defendant's marble stairs. The court, in affirming
the trial court's action of granting defendant's motion for instructed verdict,
concluded that there was no evidence of defendant's negligence.' Had the
court terminated its opinion at that point, it would have simply been one of
many cases which are lost because plaintiff failed to satisfy the burden of
proof. Unfortunately, however, the court unnecessarily went further and as-
sumed that even if the bank were negligent, the condition was "open and ob-
vious." The opinion then became famous for its dictum, not its holding.
In A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasney" a sixteen-year-old boy, upon leaving the
defendant's premises, walked through a plate glass window adjacent to the
entry door. While the court spoke of the legal duties owed by the possessor to
the boy, it concluded that it was "apparent from the evidence adduced that the
danger of injuring himself by walking into said window was obvious to ap-
pellee or that it should have been observed by him in the exercise of reasonable
care." A reasonable construction of this language is that the plaintiff failed
consideration. For example, while a landowner might owe a duty of ordinary care to an
adult invitee, such a duty may not extend to the adult trespasser. Certain fact situations also
arise in which the occupier does not have an initial duty to warn. See Phillips Pipe Line Co.
v. Razo, 420 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1967). The initial duty may be upon the entrant to make
reasonable inquiry of the occupier concerning the location of potentially dangerous condi-
tions. Pioneer Natural Gas Co. v. K & M Paving Co., 374 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex. 1963).
31 141 Tex. 332, 172 S.W.2d 297 (1943).
8CI. Sargent v. Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S.W.2d 787 (1953) (children-guests
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for riding with incompetent and reckless driver).
p3271 S.W.2d at 393-94.
14146 Tex. 387, 207 S.W.2d 374 (1948).
1 Id. at 388, 207 S.W.2d at 375.




to maintain a proper lookout for his own safety as a matter of law. However,
it has been classified as a "no duty"'" and "open and obvious"" case even
though the court's discussion of the defendant's duty to the boy had little, if any,
bearing on its ultimate conclusion that contributory negligence precluded his
recovery.
The plaintiff in Marshall v. San Jacinto Building" stumbled over a slight
elevation in a granite slab upon which defendant's revolving door was located.
More than ten million people had used the building since its construction and
only three injuries involving the use of the door (not necessarily the elevation
in the slab) had been reported. The slight elevation was observable to anyone
that looked at it, although plaintiff denied knowing of its presence prior to
tripping and being injured. Defendant's instructed verdict was affirmed on the
grounds that defendant owed plaintiff "no duty," .open and obvious" con-
ditions, and that defendant was not negligent. The "no duty" concept is cer-
tainly subject to criticism under the facts because defendant owed plaintiff a
duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and, if it was
not open and obvious to plaintiff (a subjective test),"' at least a fact issue
could be raised by the evidence." A sounder basis for the result was that the
premises were not, as a matter of law, unreasonably dangerous. Such a determi-
nation would involve a consideration of notice or lack of notice of the condition
to the defendant, the number of exposures to the risk in comparison to the
number of prior injuries, and whether a reasonable man could foresee harm
from the risk. These factors, however, are more closely allied to defendant's
negligence than defendant's duty.
The San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals ruled that a judgment n.o.v. must
be entered in Hausman Packing Co. v. Badwey.4' The plaintiff fell from de-
fendant's meat truck, and unsuccessfully argued that he should be treated like
a passenger on a bus or street car, because of the higher duty that defendant
would owe him. The court, however, likened the meat truck to a house and
determined that plaintiff could not recover because he was charged in law with
knowledge of the slippery floor, lack of handrails, and inadequacy of steps. If
defendant created a risk of harm prior to plaintiff's entry and plaintiff did not
consent or assent thereto, defendant was negligent. Unless there was consent or
willingness by plaintiff to encounter a risk and the defendant acted upon
that willingness in permitting entry instead of denying it, there was no
voluntary assumption of risk. The remaining question of contributory negli-
gence, in law or in fact, could then have been resolved on the record.
The McKee court was also confronted with whether it should examine the
S Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 383 (Tex. 1963).
'9 Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1966).
4067 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933), error ref.
" For example, in J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Brockman, 134 Tex. 451, 135 S.W.2d 698
(1940), an abrupt change in elevation from one and one-half to three inches raised an in-
ference of defendant's negligence. The court expressly refused to recognize that this slight
offset was open and obvious as a matter of law. To reconcile this holding with Marshall is
difficult.
42Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 459 (Tex. 1972), recognizes that
"open and obvious" is a law question, which raises some interesting collateral questions.
See part IV infra.
147 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941), error ref.
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conduct of the plaintiff in determining the defendant's duty. It felt bound by
the "substantive law of the state"" and declined to examine only the defendant's
conduct to determine defendant's duty, reasoning that the defendant owed
plaintiff no duty if the risk was voluntarily assumed. As stated earlier, it is
fundamentally sound to say that if plaintiff has expressly consented to the risk
of harm (true volenti non fit injuria), the defendant owes plaintiff no further
duty with respect to that risk. However, once defendant creates an unreason-
able risk of harm and is thus negligent, only contributory negligence should
bar plaintiff's recovery.
Two fact situations will illustrate the problem. First, assume that the land-
owner creates a dangerous open and obvious condition, knows and appreciates
the danger he has created, yet fails to warn the plaintiff, whom he reasonably
knows will be injured by it. Second, assume that the landowner does not know
of the dangerous condition, but that he should know of it and of the foreseeable
harm to plaintiff. The defendant's conduct is far more reprehensible in the
first instance than in the second. Yet, in both situations, the existence and vio-
lation of defendant's duty is judged by one standard-the standard of ordinary
care. The only concern is whether he maintained the premises in a reasonably
safe condition, no more and no less. Therefore, in order to be perfectly fair to
both parties in a negligence case, the plaintiff's conduct should be gauged by
the same standard. So long as the defendant has created an unreasonable risk
of harm and is negligent, it should make no difference whether plaintiff
actually knew and appreciated, or simply should have known of, the danger.
The test in a negligence case should be whether defendant and plaintiff were
negligent, taking into consideration what they knew or should have known.
The test of the reasonably prudent person should be the sole criterion for both
parties, rather than for the defendant alone.
The development of tort law in England and this country has historically
favored the owner or occupier of land by restricting the defendant's duty
through classification devices such as trespasser, licensee, business invitee, social
guest, natural condition of the land, and others. Criticism of these classifications
is not intended here, but it must be recognized that they are devices used to
limit the defendant's duty. A basic question is what policy of the law now
requires that a defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care be discharged by
plaintiff's encounter with the danger. Hopefully, it can be agreed that the
bases of the duties that exist in tort law are founded upon social utility. That
is to say, the defendant is required to keep his premises reasonably safe because
it serves a useful, social purpose. By the same token, the plaintiff is required
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety because it is a type of conduct that
comports with the socially acceptable standards imposed by the law.
In modern society, is social utility served when the defendant's duty is dis-
charged upon the fortuitous circumstance that the plaintiff discovers and
encounters the danger prior to the infliction of harm? Note that the defendant
has done nothing; his liability is determined by plaintiff's conduct and know-
ledge. Therefore, it might be argued that the defendant should hope for a
" 271 S.W.2d at 394.
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mentally alert plaintiff, one who will more readily know and appreciate the
danger than one whose mind is dull, who will neither know nor appreciate the
defendant's breach of duty until after the injury. Justice is not served by such
distinctions.
Returning to McKee, what social purpose is achieved when the law dis-
charges a negligent contractor's duty to an injured workman simply because
the latter saw that the gym floor was slick? If the slick floor was unreasonably
dangerous and the responsibility of the contractor, plaintiff's knowledge should
not relieve the defendant of his duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition.
Before leaving the McKee era, two earlier cases should be discussed. One is
Wood v. Kane Boiler Works,' in which plaintiff's husband was killed while
hydrostatically testing steel pipe that had been defectively welded by the de-
fendant. The jury found that defendant's negligence proximately caused the
death and that the deceased was not contributorily negligent. Defendant urged
"no duty" and the assumption of risk defense. The court refused to pass directly
on assumption of risk, since assumed risk applied only to master-servant cases,
and plaintiff was not defendant's employee. In resolving the "no duty" question,
the court said that the deceased's failure to consent to the risk of harm that
caused the accident, necessarily resolved any assumed risk or volenti question
adversely to defendant. If the court was speaking of express consent, there is
no inconsistency with fundamental tort principles. As long as the plaintiff (1)
knows, appreciates, and consents to the danger that creates the risk of harm,
(2) communicates that willingness to subject himself to the exposure to the
defendant, and (3) defendant relies upon that willingness before the plaintiff
proceeds with the encounter, the defendant's conduct is privileged. The de-
ceased was a tester and his work undoubtedly involved some risks of harm.
However, as the court made clear, the risk of harm that killed Wood resulted
from an initial defective weld rather than the subsequent welds that were being
tested at the time he met his death. For example, if the defendant had told the
deceased of the possibility of the existence of the defective weld that actually
caused death and the deceased was willing to inspect the pipe with that knowl-
edge, then it would properly be said that the deceased consented to that risk;
but when the defendant does not change his position in reliance upon the
plaintiff's consent or assent to the exposure, the defendant's original antisocial,
unreasonable conduct (negligence) continues to be antisocial even though the
plaintiff becomes aware of it prior to injury. In such a case, recovery should
not be denied unless the victim also acts unreasonably.
The other case is Shiller v. Rice,' in which the plaintiff passengers sued the
defendant driver for gross negligence under the Texas guest statute. The jury
found that defendant's driving while intoxicated was gross negligence and a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Under the evidence, plaintiffs knew of
defendant's intoxication, had a reasonable opportunity to leave the car, but
did not do so. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded:
' 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951).46 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952).
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[T~he plaintiffs were heedless and reckless of their own safety as a matter of
law, and that, as a matter of law, this heedless and reckless disregard of their
own safety was a proximate cause of their injuries. It is our further conclusion
that the plaintiffs voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of injury by
failing to leave the automobile and 'put themselves in the way of danger' of
their own free will.
47
In other words, the court barred plaintiffs' recoveries based on contributory
negligence as a matter of law and volenti. Why bar recovery on both grounds?
Perhaps it is because, in an earlier part of the opinion, the court stated that
the differences between contributory negligence and volenti were more philo-
sophical than real. With all due respect, had the court realized that something
more fundamental than philosophy was involved, it would have decided the
case on the basis of contributory negligence alone unless the evidence showed
that the plaintiffs expressly consented to the risk of harm before riding with
defendant while he was in such a condition.
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND VOLENTI
As previously stated, contributory negligence bars plaintiff's recovery be-
cause of fault, the cornerstone of negligence law. Volenti, on the other hand,
as most often used by the court has nothing to do with fault. Quite the contrary,
volenti, under certain situations, has been said to exist and defeat plaintiff even
though he is not at fault. Several factual variations of this case will illustrate
the point:
(1) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff enters defendant's car for
purely social purposes and does not reasonably learn of defendant's
intoxication until the defendant reaches a high rate of speed, at
which point defendant swerves into the left lane and collides with
an oncoming car.
(2) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff enters defendant's car for
purely social purposes at a time when he has actual knowledge of
defendant's intoxication. Defendant immediately reaches a high rate
of speed, swerves into the left lane and collides with an oncoming
car.
(3) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff enters defendant's car for
purely social reasons at a time when he does not have actual knowl-
edge, but in the exercise of ordinary care should know, of defendant's
intoxication. Defendant's conduct is then the same as set forth in
example 2.
(4) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff enters defendant's car for
purely social reasons but does not reasonably learn of defendant's
intoxication for several minutes. Between the time of learning of
defendant's condition and the accident arising from defendant's con-
duct set forth in example 2, plaintiff has an opportunity to leave
the car, but unreasonably fails to do so.
(5) The same facts as example 4, except that plaintiff does not act un-
47Id. at 128, 246 S.W.2d at 615.
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reasonably in failing to leave the car. For example, the only oppor-
tunity to leave the car is in a strange slum area in the middle of the
night.
(6) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff, an employee of defendant,
is aware of defendant's condition and initially declines the defen-
dant's offer of transportation. Defendant threatens to fire plaintiff if
he refuses, so plaintiff reluctantly enters the car and an accident
arising from defendant's conduct occurs as set forth in example 2.
(7) Defendant driver is intoxicated. Plaintiff is a pregnant woman des-
perately needing medical attention. She stops defendant and is im-
mediately aware of his condition before she enters the car. Never-
theless, she does enter and an accident arising from defendant's con-
duct occurs as set forth in example 2.
If the differences between contributory negligence and voluntary assumption
of risk are more philosophical than real, then except for perhaps 1 and 5,
plaintiff was contributorily negligent or plaintiff consented to the risk of harm
in each instance. However, can it be said in all fairness that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in 7 or that plaintiff consented to the harm in 3?
Comparing some of the other examples will point up real, not philo-
sophical, differences between contributory negligence and voluntary assump-
tion of risk. Look at 2 and 3. To say that plaintiff's conduct should bar re-
covery in both instances merely begs the question. In 3, plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent-he failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.
But in 2, plaintiff may have a number of reasons for entering the auto know-
ing of defendant's condition and still not be at fault; at least reasonable minds
could properly justify or excuse the plaintiff's conduct. For example, see 6
and 7.
Contrast 4 and 5. In both instances the defendant was negligent at the time
the plaintiff entered the automobile; he violated his duty of care by exposing
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff did not consent to injury.
In both situations, the plaintiff learned of defendant's condition but the
plaintiff's conduct should not be judged in terms of voluntary assumption of
risk in either situation. Rather, the question is whether plaintiff acted reason-
ably after learning of defendant's condition."' If there were no substantial
difference between contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk,
plaintiff would be barred in 5 by the latter because he knows, appreciates, and
voluntarily encounters the danger. However, such cases are decided on the
basis of contributory negligence.4 The loss is placed on the party at fault."
In 4 and 5, the "no duty" concept is also inapplicable. If defendant not
only owed plaintiff a duty but in fact breached that duty at the moment
plaintiff entered the car, it is difficult to understand what would suddenly
change defendant's affirmative duty of ordinary care to the status of "no
4
'Bernal v. Seitt, 158 Tex. 521, 526, 313 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1958); Webb v. Karsten,
308 S.W.2d 114, 121-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957).
49 Id.
"
0 For example, in Sargent v. Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S.W.2d 787 (1953), plain-
tiffs were contributorily negligent as a matter of law for riding with an incompetent, reckless
defendant. Discussion of voluntary assumption of risk and "no duty" was unnecessary.
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duty." In each instance the defendant has committed antisocial conduct and
breached a duty to the public. How then, should 7 be analyzed? The plaintiff
knew of defendant's condition before her entry and the dangers of riding
with a drunk. At this point, defendant did not have to give her a ride. By
doing so, he alters his conduct and commits himself to a course of action
relying upon the plaintiff's consent and willingness to incur the risks of harm
attendant to her urgent journey. Since defendant's driving while intoxicated
is a breach of duty, to say that he owed "no duty" is difficult. Hence, a more
plausable explanation for denying plaintiff recovery would be a determination
that she consented to the risk of harm.
Shortly after McKee, the court was confronted with McElhenny v.
Thielepape,"' in which plaintiff was injured at the defendant doctor's office
when she was hit by a swing in which children were playing. She had observed
this activity for some time and thought she had room to pass between the
swing and a chair. Holding that the trial court was correct in granting de-
fendant's motion for an instructed verdict, the court expressly stated that the
defendant owed plaintiff no duty, the swing was not a dangerous instru-
mentality, the plaintiff was aware of the danger, the defendant could not
foresee the risk of harm, and plaintiff could have easily avoided it." In a
later opinion, it was treated as "an open and obvious as a matter of law" case."
These theories, as announced by the court, have only one thing in common:
the plaintiff loses. The similarity ends at that point. To say that defendant owes
no duty to plaintiff is far different from saying defendant owes a duty but does
not violate it. To say that defendant owes plaintiff a duty and violates it, but
that plaintiff is willing to proceed in spite of defendant's violation, is still
something else. To state that defendant has violated his duty and that plaintiff
has also been negligent is yet another basis for determining the denial of
liability. Only by a clear analysis of the different bases can conflict and con-
fusion be avoided.
III. POST-MCKEE DEVELOPMENTS
What has the post-McKee era done to resolve these problems? Halepeska
v. Callihan Interests, Inc.4 assisted in explaining the apparent equation of
"knew and appreciated" with "should have known and appreciated" in McKee
by recognizing that the two phrases are not synonomous; the former concerned
volenti and the latter contributory negligence. Otherwise, while the court did
attempt to distinguish between the "no duty" and volenti concepts, it essentially
followed in the footsteps of McKee. The court's effectiveness in clarifying this
troublesome area can best be evaluated by analyzing some of its more recent
decisions.
The jury found in Western Auto Supply Co., v. Campbell" that plaintiff, a
customer in defendant's store, was warned by the defendant's employee of the
"' 155 Tex. 319, 285 S.W.2d 940 (-956).
2 Id. at 322, 285 S.W.2d at 941-42.
"Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tex. 1963).
54371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
"1271 S.W.2d at 394.
5"373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1963).
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dangerous condition of the floor before he encountered it and slipped and fell.
The court assumed that the floor was dangerous, thus creating an unreasonable
risk of harm. The court treated these facts as a "no duty" case. However, it
seems more reasonable to say that the defendant had a duty to maintain the
premises in reasonably safe condition regardless of whether warning was given
or the condition was open and obvious. This should be a continuing duty that
is not extinguished by plaintiff's conduct but can be fulfilled only by defendant
when he does in fact maintain reasonably safe premises.
Under the analysis earlier suggested, a court would recognize that the de-
fendant, by creating an unreasonable risk of harm, was negligent. However,
when the plaintiff indicated his willingness to accept the risk, thus causing
the defendant to commit himself to a certain course of conduct, the defendant
purged himself of any antisocial conduct and the plaintiff consented to the
risk. Specifically, when defendant's employee told plaintiff of the danger,
plaintiff could indicate that he did not want to walk on the slippery floor or
that he was willing to risk the harm. If the plaintiff indicates the former, the
defendant could steer him clear to a place of safety or otherwise exercise
reasonable care for him. However, plaintiff's express consent to accept the risk
would relieve defendant of further protection respecting that risk. Once the
defendant's option or alternative is removed by plaintiff's consent, defendant's
conduct concerning that risk becomes privileged.
Hernandez v. Heldenels1 required the court to make an exception to its
concept of "open and obvious" dangers within the "no duty" doctrine, by limit-
ing its application to conditions which are "static" (holes, pits, etc.).58
The plaintiff in Wesson v. Gillespie"s was injured after stumbling over the
threshold of the entry door at defendant's tavern, which she had frequented
for many years. The trial judge determined that there was neither evidence
that the threshold was unreasonably dangerous nor evidence that plaintiff was
free of contributory negligence. If supported by the record, such a determina-
tion has always been a proper function of the court. The supreme court, how-
ever, did not base its affirmance of the trial court's judgment n.o.v. upon
57374 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1963).
51 Id. at 200-01. Even the sub-classification of "static" conditions creates problems. See
Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1966), where plaintiff walked through a sliding
glass door of a motel at night. Four members of the majority distinguished A.C. Burton Co.
v. Stasney, 223 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949), error ret. (plaintiff walked
through plate glass window next to entry door upon leaving store) because a sliding glass
door is not a static condition, the incident occurred at night rather than during the day, and
plaintiff did not know the door was closed. The fact that Stasney walked into a plate glass
window and Liebman through a closed glass door was not discussed. These judges concluded
that defendant could not prevail under the defense of voluntary assumption of risk. The
Chief Justice concurred because the condition was not open and obvious. The four dissenting
judges, under the authority of Stasney, would have rendered judgment for defendant by
charging plaintiff in law with voluntary assumption of risk. These cases illustrate graphically
the doctrinal quagmire which can result from a simple set of facts. If the court can be so
finely divided in initial classification of static conditions and, further, be unable to agree on
the applicability of voluntary assumption of risk as compared to "no duty," how can the bar
be expected to handle future cases? When does a condition become static? Is it a question
of fact or law? At what point does it become open and obvious? How many exposures to
danger does it take to charge the plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation? If the court
disregarded its concept of static conditions, "no duty," and voluntary assumption of risk
and utilized the simple primary/contributory negligence formulas, these problems could
be eliminated.
59382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964).
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either of those grounds. Rather, it held that the plaintiff, by continuing to
expose herself to the condition after knowledge and appreciation of its dangers,
was barred, as a matter of law, by voluntary assumption of risk. Perhaps
plaintiff should not have recovered in this case, but to deny liability based upon
plaintiff's consent to harm (the basis of voluntary assumption of risk) is
subject to criticism. No one can seriously believe that the plaintiff consented
to being hurt. To say that she did is a fiction-she certainly did not con-
template injury from tripping over the threshold. According to the trial court,
the defendant satisfied his duty to maintain the threshold in a reasonably safe
condition and was not negligent. The court recognized the meagerness of evi-
dence, if any, on this point, but nevertheless assumed defendant's negligence
and decided the case on voluntary assumption of risk. Thus, under the court's
reasoning, this case is a classic example of a negligent defendant prevailing
against a non-negligent plaintiff in a negligence case."' The most simple and
fundamental method of handling such cases would be to follow the example of
the trial court--either the defendant acted reasonably as a matter of law or
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In either event,
imposition of, or escape from, liability would be based upon negligence,
nothing more and nothing less.
With respect to the court's recognition that warning the plaintiff discharges
the defendant's duty to exercise ordinary care, the next step would be to im-
pose vicarious knowledge on the plaintiff by issuing the warning to plaintiff's
superiors. 1 Strong policy arguments can be made on both sides of the question
of whether knowledge of a warning given plaintiff's foreman should be im-
puted to plaintiff. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. How-
ever, it does point up one of the ancillary problems that can arise when a court
equates the duty to warn with the duty to exercise ordinary care. What happens
when the defendant does not warn plaintiff's superior in fact, but supplies him
with information from which knowledge of the danger is apparent, thus
charging plaintiff's superior with knowledge in law? Is this in turn imputed to
plaintiff (a double imputation or charging of knowledge), thus discharging
defendant's duty to warn?"2
Voluntariness. Aside from the above doctrinal problems that are created by
the use of "no duty" and the voluntary assumption of risk defense in a negli-
gence case, other difficulties remain. Since consent or voluntary assent lies at
the heart of voluntary assumption of risk," so that the injured party makes an
intelligent choice either to proceed in the face of danger or to seek an alternate
course," the meaning of the word "voluntary" must be determined. Does it
apply to plaintiffs who are confronted with both reasonable and unreasonable
1J. & W. Corp. v. Ball, 414 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1967), is another illustration and
additionally exemplifies the confusion between classification of static versus non-static con-
ditions, and "no duty" versus voluntary assumption of risk.
"' Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
2 See, e.g., Guidry v. Neches Butane Prods. Co., 476 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. 1972), in which
this question was raised but not necessary to decide because of insufficient summary judg-
ment facts.
"
3Dee v. Parrish, 160 Tex. 171, 174, 327 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1959).
"Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963).
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alternatives? In Blanks v. Southland Hotel, Inc." the pre-McKee court had
before it a defendant that failed to maintain its hotel in a reasonably safe
condition. The plaintiff, a paying guest, was injured while descending the
steps (his only method of exit and entry) for the first time at night during
his three-week occupancy. After viewing the facts, the court refused to find
plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Defendant additionally urged "open and obvious" and voluntary assumption
of risk defenses as a matter of law. While the court preferred to gauge the
plaintiff's conduct by the contributory negligence standard, it recognized that
plaintiff's conduct was not voluntary." If the room clerk had advised plaintiff
of the risk before assigning him the room, but plaintiff assented to encounter-
ing it, there would be a strong policy reason for invoking the privilege of
consent and barring plaintiff's recovery, for the reason that plaintiff's consent
deprives the defendant of an alternate course of conduct (such as giving the
plaintiff a room on another floor where such hazards are not present or refusing
to give him a room at all).
In McKee the court indicated that economic compulsion to encounter the
risk did not vitiate the voluntariness of the encounter. ' In other words, the
plaintiff's decision to encounter the danger rather than losing his job for re-
fusing to encounter it was purely "voluntary." A later attempt by a court of
civil appeals to label such a choice as an "unreasonable requirement" was
unsuccessful."6
Other plaintiffs have faced similar dilemmas and lost. An injured lady, in
a hurry to receive emergency aid, who slipped on the defendant hospital's steps,
had the choice of staying at home, finding another hospital, or leaving her
wound unattended. 9 One patient had the choice of staying in bed or using the
bathroom," while another could either step over a television cord to go home
or stay at the hospital.' To say that each of these victims was confronted with
a reasonable alternative and exercised free choice is unrealistic. Such subtle
5 149 Tex. 139, 229 S.W.2d 357 (1950).
" Id. at 144, 229 S.W.2d at 360:
Plaintiff had no way of reaching the floor where his room was, or of de-
scending from it, other than by using the stairway between the eighth and
ninth floors. While his situation in this regard was voluntary in the sense he
willingly became a tenant on the ninth floor, it was involuntary in the sense
that it was the only way provided by the Hotel whereby he, as such tenant,
could use his room. He was aware, as indicated by his movements, that this
predicament had become hazardous but such awareness is not conclusive that
he was negligent as a matter of law in making use of the passageway.
Two points should be emphasized from the above quotation: First, the possessor's duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition should not be satisfied or extinguished
even though the danger is open and obvious, known and appreciated. Second, implicit is the
concept that negligence cases should be won or lost on fault.
67271 S.W.2d at 396. This conclusion formed the basis for the dissenting opinion.
66 Greenwood v. Lowe Chem. Co., 428 S.W.2d 358, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]), rev'd, 433 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1968).
"Gulfway Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Pursley, 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965),
error ref. n.r.e.
'*Methodist Hosp. v. Hudson, 465 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971), error ref. n.r.e.




forms of coercion" which leave the plaintiff no reasonable alternative are at
odds with a system of liability based on fault. If plaintiff's choice is unreason-
able, it is simply one of the factors to be considered in a determination of
contributory negligence.
Exceptions. While presently committed to these doctrines in limiting liability
for the benefit of the owner or occupier of premises and others initially re-
sponsible for the harmful instrumentality, the court has recognized certain
areas where they simply will not work.
Rescuer. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Winder" plaintiff voluntarily exposed
himself to a risk created by the defendant's negligence. Yet he was permitted
to recover because he was attempting to halt a runaway rail car threatening
fellow workers who were unaware of the danger. No one could seriously
quarrel with allowing the rescuer recovery. The policy of the law has an ap-
pealing, moralistic flavor. There is great social utility in protecting the rescuer-
victim; there is little, if any, in protecting the tortfeasor.
The rescue case is recognized as an exception to the negating of "no duty"
and voluntary assumption of risk defense. 4 Such a case should be compared
with Gulfway General Hospital v. Pursley, in which plaintiff, slipping on the
icy steps of defendant's emergency entrance in an effort to receive emergency
care, was barred as a matter of law because of the "no duty-open and obvious"
doctrine. The only real difference between the rescuer and Mrs. Pursley is that
Mrs. Pursley was thinking of herself and the rescuer was thinking of another.
Unless a greater premium is to be placed on the act of helping another, rather
than an act of helping oneself, in a moment of peril or emergency, this is
a distinction without a difference. To put such cases in their proper perspective,
assume that, as Mrs. Pursley approached the icy emergency entrance, an invitee
stood nearby in a place of safety. Each sees the icy condition on the steps and
is fully aware of the danger to those who venture forth. Mrs. Pursley, with her
hand bleeding badly, gets near the top step and commences to lose her balance.
The invitee immediately comes to her aid. Both slip, fall on the ice, and are
injured. Under the existing state of the law, does Mrs. Pursley lose because the
hospital owes her no duty? Does the rescuer prevail even though he knew,
appreciated, and voluntarily exposed himself to known danger? If the hospital
created an unreasonable risk of harm and becomes a tortfeasor to one, it is
a tortfeasor to both. Mrs. Pursley's desire to receive emergency aid for her
injury and the motive prompting those who attempt her rescue should be
encouraged and protected by the courts with equal dignity.
Master-Servant. Another exception is found in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Rob-
inson," in which plaintiff was injured on the premises of the defendant-employ-
er by falling in a pool of oil which was open and obvious. Since the employer
did not carry workmen's compensation insurance, the defenses of contributory
" Coercion, the term employed in Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner,
22 LA. L. REv. 108, 118-20 (1961), is far more accurate than voluntariness.
73 340 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960), error ref.
74 HIalepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963).
7' 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), error ref. n.r.e.78 154 Tex. 336, 280 S.W.2d 238 (1955).
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negligence and assumed risk were unavailable." The defendant logically con-
tended that, under the case law then existing, since the landowner's duty was
either to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition or warn, the
plaintiff must negate "no duty" because the latter concept was distinct from
assumption of risk as set forth in McKee. The court distinguished McKee for
the reason that McKee was a "landowner-invitee" case and not a "master-
servant" case, refused to apply the "no duty--open and obvious" concept, and
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. If the employee of a non-subscribing em-
ployer does not have to negate "no duty" and is not barred by open and
obvious conditions, the law should afford a business invitee on the employer's
premises the same protection for the identical risk of harm that has been cre-
ated by the defendant-employer's negligence.
Landlord-Tenant. Finally, the court excepts the landlord-tenant relation. In
Harvey v. Seale78 the minor plaintiff, whose parents leased the premises from
the defendant, momentarily forgot the hole in the porch. The court classified
her as a lessee, or at least distinguished her from an invitee on the theory that
she was present by matter of right under the lease, and not by the lessor's
consent, so that the child's knowledge and appreciation of the danger did not
extinguish the defendant's duty to repair the defect."9 Implicit in the court's
opinion, however, is the conclusion that if the child had been an invitee,
recovery would have been barred based on either "no duty" or volenti. The
risk of harm created by the defendant is unchanged whether the child is the
daughter of a tenant, a prospective tenant, or a business invitee. To say that
the lessee is not on the premises by virtue of the lessor's consent, but that the
business invitee is present by consent is a difficult concept to grasp. The lessor
does not have to lease the premises. He simply permits or consents to lessee's
occupancy upon the payment of the rent in a way similar to the way that he
consents or permits the invitee to enter upon the expectation that the invitee
may purchase or rent. Are we not accustomed to exercising the same standard
of reasonable care for the tenant and invitee alike? Both the invitee and
lessee should reasonably expect the same protection from the possessor. The
law should not impose negating "no duty" and voluntary assumption of risk on
one any more than the other.
IV. FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS
The "open and obvious" doctrine is included within the ambit of negating
"no duty" because of defendant's alternate duty to warn plaintiff of those
11TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 1 (1917).
"s362 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1962).
" Why should we treat those plaintiffs just beneath the dignity of a lessee any differently?
In Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972), plaintiff urged that she was
entitled to the same protection afforded a lessee since she was present on the premises as
a matter of right under a one-year contract as a member of defendant's health spa. The
court likened her to an invitee, and, therefore, subject to "no duty" and voluntary assump-
tion of risk. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965), which would seem to
protect such a plaintiff, but was not discussed in Sharpe, states: "(2) The plaintiff's ac-
ceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has left him no rea-
sonable alternative course of conduct in order to . . . (b) exercise or protect a right or
privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him." Cf. Denton v. Poole, 478
S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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conditions which were not open and obvious."0 In attempting to clarify the
problem presented by "open and obvious," the court has now determined it
to be a question of law, not to be submitted to the jury as a special issue. The
trial judge must decide whether there is proof that plaintiff has negated "no
duty" and is to be charged with actual knowledge and appreciation as a matter
of law under the voluntary assumption of risk defense. 1
However, Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe"5 leaves several questions unresolved
in this area and will require further clarification. One problem arises because
"open and obvious" has frequently referred to a condition!' while "voluntary
assumption of risk" has been concerned with a specific danger." The purpose
of this Article is not to become embroiled in the special issue submission of
voluntary assumption of risk. Rather, it is to analyze the theories involved in
its application. A simple fact situation will illustrate this precise aspect of the
problem in light of the special issue submission of voluntary assumption of
risk suggested by Adam Dante." Assume that a business invitee enters defend-
ant's premises and sees a clear liquid on the floor. Reasonably believing that the
liquid is water, which presents no danger, plaintiff proceeds to walk through
it. However, the liquid is not water, but clear silicone, upon which he slips
and falls. The condition was open and obvious, but the specific danger of the
encounter resulting from silicone instead of water was neither known nor
appreciated. Since the court adopts the Restatement position," the open and
obvious doctrine should apply only if the dangerous characteristics of the
condition were open and obvious. Therefore, under our hypothetical case,
plaintiff would have negated "no duty" as a matter of law.
The nice distinctions drawn by the court between "conditions" and "danger"
have not served to minimize the confusion. Rabb v. Coleman7 is an example in
"'See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1963).
S1Massman-Johnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1972); Adam Dante Corp. v.
Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972).
82483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972).
Id. at 457 ("A plaintiff, such as Mrs. Sharpe, may be charged in law with knowledge
and appreciation of a dangerous condition if the condition is open and obvious to her.");
Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Tex. 1966).
"Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963) ("[A) per-
son may not recover for an injury received when he voluntarily exposed himself to a known
and appreciated danger.").
81483 S.W.2d at 458 n.2:
Did plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk of [stating it)? (Subjective Test)
You are instructed that in order for the plaintiff [naming), to assume the
risk, she must have actually known of the conditions which caused her injury
and she also must have actually and fully appreciated the nature and extent of
the danger involved in encountering the condition, and she must have vol-
untarily and of her own free will encountered the danger of the condition
causing her injuries, if any.
"
5 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (emphasis added):
Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor. A possessor
of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the con-
dition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will
fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
17469 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1971).
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which the owner of the premises was killed from the ignition of butane that
occurred while the defendant's employee was filling the deceased's butane
tank. The jury found defendant negligent, failed to find the deceased con-
tributorily negligent, but found that the deceased knew and exposed himself
to a dangerous condition. In a five-to-four decision, judgment for the defendant
was affirmed on the defensive theory of volenti. The dissent argued that know-
ledge and appreciation of, and exposure to, the condition were not sufficient,
i.e., knowledge of, and exposure to, the specific danger (that the pop-off valve
would not perform its function and thus create a danger rather than eliminating
it) was required, and would have affirmed the intermediate appellate court."
The majority opinion did not refer to facts which showed that, as a matter
of subjective knowledge, the deceased knew that the activation of the pop-off
valve would create a danger. One could theorize that the court was thinking
in terms of "no duty" as regards a condition, yet it constantly refers to the
volenti doctrine.
Returning to the assumed fact situation, assume further that the defendant
testifies that he warned the plaintiff that the liquid was silicone, but the plain-
tiff denies the warning. If "open and obvious," as part of the "no duty" doctrine,
performs a useful purpose, why should not the truth or falsity of the de-
fendant's testimony to determine the existence of duty be submitted to the
jury as any other disputed issue of fact? To say that it is a law question since
it relates to the defendant's duty simply begs the question, because the court
frequently submits fact questions to the jury prior to the determination of
duty.89 Possibly the best reason for making it a law question is to reduce the
number of vexing problems that exist in an already too confused area. Suppose,
however, that defendant does not plead voluntary assumption of risk as a de-
fense or that, under the facts, it is a "no duty" case. In such a situation, even
though there may be disputed facts concerning the "open and obvious" charac-
ter of the dangerous condition, will "open and obvious" nevertheless be a law
question or will an exception to the announced rule be required?
Another question comes to mind. If "open and obvious" is a question of
law, does it cut both ways? Under the present state of the law, a Texas court
is permitted to determine that a dangerous condition was open and obvious as
a matter of law, and thus direct a verdict for the defendant." Should the trial
court determine that a condition was not open and obvious as a matter of law
if warranted by the facts?" Returning to the example of the silicone on the
88 Id. at 388-89.
89 For example, if the evidence conflicts on the plaintiff's status as a licensee or invitee,
the trial court might properly submit the question to the jury concerning whether plaintiff
was on the land as a result of permission or a business venture. After the jury answers this
question, the court then applies the duty standard applicable to such classification. Cf. Cole-
man v. Hudson Gas & Oil Corp., 455 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. 1970) (defendant under no duty
to protect plaintiff from risk unless factually determined that defendant undertook to bleed
high pressure gas line).
" See, e.g., A.C. Burton Co. v. Stasney, 223 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1949), error ref.
"Compare the original opinion in Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
371, 376 (June 21, 1972) (emphasis added) that: "Mrs. Sharpe will have the burden to
prove that Adam Dante owed some duty of reasonable care toward her, including her burden
to show either that she neither knew of nor appreciated the danger or that she was not
charged in law with knowledge and appreciation. The court, however, will make the decision
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floor, a court could properly say that the danger was not, as a matter of law,
open and obvious. If the court made the determination that plaintiff has
negated "no duty" as a matter of law, it could logically have the effect of
determining that voluntary assumption of risk does not exist as a matter of
law. Since "open and obvious" is an underlying element of voluntary assump-
tion of risk,"2 a strong argument could be made that voluntary assumption of
risk is not raised by the evidence once plaintiff denies knowledge of the con-
dition's dangerous propensity. This is particularly true since the voluntary
assumption of risk defense is measured subjectively.
While the court might have been referring to only that portion of "open
and obvious" that relates to "no duty" as distinguished from voluntary assump-
tion of risk (which can theoretically result because of the overlap between the
two), what will be the result when the trial judge, in deciding the "open and
obvious" duty question, concludes that plaintiff has negated "no duty" by
subjectively establishing lack of knowledge and appreciation as a matter of
law? One could persuasively argue that the voluntary assumption of risk issue
should not be submitted since one of its essential elements is lacking. But what
if the court nevertheless submits the voluntary assumption of risk issue and the
jury answers it in favor of defendant? One could further theorize that each
time the trial court refuses to instruct a verdict for defendant, it is because
plaintiff has negated "no duty" as a matter of law, thus eliminating the requisite
subjective knowledge to raise the voluntary assumption of risk defense. If this
were the result, the therapeutic effect of limiting the defense would be achieved.
Needless to say, all these questions could be easily removed from consideration
by reverting to the primary/contributory negligence formula.
V. RESULTS OF MCKEE DOCTRINE
Application of the McKee doctrine can lead to unjust results. Gulfway
General Hospital v. Pursley,3 in which plaintiff slipped and fell on the icy
emergency entrance to defendant's hospital where she was going to obtain
treatment for the severed tip of a finger, is such an example. In reversing and
rendering for defendant, the court said that defendant owed no duty to plain-
tiff because the danger was open and obvious. That either the "no duty," "open
and obvious," or voluntary assumption of risk doctrine was ever intended to
reach such a result is absurd. The defendant, whose sole function is to care
for the sick and infirm, holds itself out to the public to provide medical care
and provides an emergency entrance for those in urgent need. On the one
whether she proves her lack of actual knowledge and full appreciation as well as the fact
that the condition was not open and obvious to her." with the language that was substituted
therefor upon final publication in 483 S.W.2d at 458-59 (emphasis added): "Mrs. Sharpe
must make prima facie proof that she did not know of and appreciate the danger and that
she was not charged in law with knowledge and appreciation of the danger. Upon such
showing she will be entitled to go to the jury on the issues of defendant's negligence."
This revision would indicate that "open and obvious" is for defendant's benefit only in that
the trial court will probably be permitted to find that the condition was open and obvious
and denied the right to find that it was not open and obvious.
92483 S.W.2d at 458 n.2, special issue No. 5; cf. Massman-Johnson v. Gundolf, 484
S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1972).
93397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), error ref. n.r.e.
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hand, defendant says, "Hurry in this entrance and care will be provided." On
the other hand, the court says that the defendant is under no duty to exercise
reasonable care for those at the entrance because the danger maintained by it
is so patent that the plaintiff can either take her chances or go elsewhere. The
law's callous disregard for those who need help is untenable. The case clearly
illustrates the need for recognizing that the defendant's duty to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe condition should transcend the duty to warn of
dangers neither open nor obvious."
Somewhat analagous is Methodist Hospital v. Hudson," in which the patient,
having just been given bathroom privileges, slipped and fell on the ceramic
tile bathroom floor. The jury found that defendant was negligent in failing to
provide a non-slip surface and judgment was entered for plaintiff. Charging
plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation of the danger because of seventeen
prior visits to the bathroom, the court reversed and rendered judgment for
defendant, because defendant owed plaintiff no duty. It is one thing to deny
recovery on the basis that the floor was not unreasonably dangerous (i.e., that
the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law because the floor did not
create an unreasonable risk of harm) and there might be a basis for such a
conclusion.' However, to disallow recovery because of "no duty" disregards the
defendant's duty to maintain reasonably safe premises and the basic unfairness
of imposing a decision on the patient concerning use of the bathroom privileges
afforded him, particularly when there was no evidence of prior, similar occur-
rences to put him on notice of the danger.
Sims v. Buddies Super Markets, Inc.' should also be considered. The fifty-
nine-year-old plaintiff paid for her groceries but no one was immediately
available to assist in pushing her cart to the car. She waited about twenty
minutes and commenced pushing the cart herself to the parking area where
her husband was waiting. She observed Christmas trees on both sides of the
walkway ahead and a three-foot-wide trail between them littered with pine
cones and debris in which the trees had been packed. The traffic in the parking
area was heavy. Since the walkway seemed to present less of a hazard than the
traffic in the parking lot, she began pushing her cart on pine needles and
debris, fell, and was hurt. By summarily rejecting plaintiff's argument on
"entrapment" and distinguishing Blanks v. Southland Hotel, Inc.' without com-
ment, the court affirmed defendant's summary judgment because of "no duty,"
"open and obvious," and voluntary assumption of risk.
A different approach and result, however, is found in Dunlap v. Executive
Inn Motor Hotel Corp." Plaintiff had been an occupant in one of defendant's
rooms for ten days. When she attempted to check out, she found the door to
the inner stairway locked, so she proceeded to the lobby by means of the
exterior stairs. After paying her bill, she ascended the exterior steps, went to
"See also Charrin v. Methodist Hosp., 432 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1968).
9465 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
9 See Houston Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 146 Tex. 387, 390-91, 207 S.W.2d 374, 375
(1948).
97460 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
"149 Tex. 139, 229 S.W.2d 357 (1950); see text accompanying notes 65, 66 supra.
"404 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), error ref. n.r.e.
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her room for a few moments and then descended by the same route, apparently
to meet transportation to the airport. A driving rain was blinding her when she
fell and was injured on the stairway. The court reversed a summary judgment
for defendant and remanded for trial. Considering Blanks and Gulf C. & S.F.
Ry. v. Gascamp °° to be controlling, the court felt that plaintiff was not con-
fronted with reasonable alternatives, i.e., defendant's unreasonable conduct
compelled plaintiff to proceed in spite of a known risk or one that was open
and obvious. 1 Accordingly, the court recognized that when a plaintiff reason-
ably encounters a danger with (or is chargeable with) knowledge thereof,
such an encounter becomes a question of fact within the contributory negli-
gence issue.
To reconcile Dunlap with Sims, Hudson, and Pursley is difficult. It could be
said that a motel owner owes his guest a higher duty than a hospital owes its
patient or a grocery store owes its customer. One could rationalize and say that
the law on one hand should not require Mrs. Dunlap to remain in her room
until the steps become safe or until she contacts the management to open the
inner door, but the law should require Mrs. Sims to remain inside the grocery
store, Mrs. Pursley to seek medical aid elsewhere, and Mr. Hudson to forego use
of the bathroom. Conversely, it could be said that Mrs. Sims, Mrs. Pursley, and
Mr. Hudson were injured as the result of exercising an intelligent choice to
encounter the danger, but that such an intelligent choice was denied Mrs.
Dunlap. Perhaps a more simple explanation is that the cases are in conflict.
At this point, one might legitimately wonder whether it really makes any
difference whether a given fact situation is treated as one involving "no duty,"
voluntary assumption of risk, or contributory negligence. The method employed
and analysis suggested can have several practical effects:
(1) "No duty" is a question of law for the court, while contributory negli-
gence is most often a question of fact for the jury. Voluntary assumption of
risk may be either a question of law or fact at this point because the full im-
port of Adam Dante, in which voluntary assumption of risk is clearly a sub-
jective test rather than an objective one, is not clear.
(2) The assumption of risk defense (in all except the express consent
cases) gives the defendant two theories under which to attack the plaintiff's
conduct, while plaintiff is entitled to only one concerning the defendant's
conduct. Defendant is liable only if he fails to exercise ordinary care, and
plaintiff's lack of ordinary care should be the only defensive doctrine permitted
to defeat him.
(3) Contributory negligence is not a defense to a tort inflicted intention-
ally, willfully, or wantonly."' Voluntary assumption of risk may be a defense.'
10069 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888).
1' Cf. McWilliams v. Snap-Pac Corp., 476 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (Plaintiff was unloading hydrocarbon from a truck when the
engine started running. He attempted to disconnect pump in spite of the known danger of
fire. It was held that a plaintiff acting in emergency with no time for reflection cannot
be charged with voluntary assumption of risk as a matter of law.)
101 Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 S.W. 563 (1898); City
of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963), error ref. n.r.e.;
Perkins v. Nail, 37 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931), error ref.




(4) When strict liability in tort is involved, it is not clear whether a plain-
tiff is barred by voluntary assumption of risk or only that form of contributory
negligence which arises after plaintiff's discovery of the defect. While the
court has discussed the problem, the precise issue was not before it."" However,
in applying the Erie doctrine, the Fifth Circuit"0 has recently held that the
voluntary assumption of risk defense to strict liability in tort must include an
element of unreasonable conduct by plaintiff. This seems tantamount to re-
quiring a finding of contributory negligence.
(5) When the court submits issues on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, the former affords the defendant an excellent springboard from
which to argue the latter, thus enhancing a jury finding of contributory negli-
gence. The plaintiff is denied any such benefit.
(6) Procedurally, the burden of proof on negating "no duty," including
the related concept of "open and obvious" danger, is on the plaintiff, while
contributory negligence is a burden of defendant.
One of the most persuasive arguments for abolishing voluntary assumption
of risk as a defense and requiring defendant to rely upon contributory negli-
gence is the recognition of fault as the only basis for imposing or denying
liability. The results of some of the cited cases might be the same, but some
might be different. The reason for that difference is simply that because the
defendant is negligent in creating or maintaining a dangerous condition it
does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff is negligent in the encounter. If
the owner of an office building negligently maintains a slick floor in the lobby
and the plaintiff is willing to "take a chance" in order to take her very ill
infant to the doctor's office on the fifth floor, would anyone be heard to say
that the reasons or motives that prompted the owner's conduct are the same
or even similar to those of the plaintiff? Instead of taking her child to the
doctor, suppose the plaintiff was on her way to her lawyer's office to execute
her last will and testament prior to imminent surgery? The defendant's con-
duct is equally reprehensible in each instance. While the social utility of each
plaintiff's conduct might vary in degree, the law should not deny its protection
to either plaintiff absent a finding of contributory negligence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In McKee the court was squarely confronted with whether to recognize
contributory negligence as the exclusive defensive doctrine. Its declination to
do so was unfortunate. The question was reconsidered in Halepeska, but the
0' Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785-86 (Tex. 1967);
see Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textile, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1971), error ref. n.r.e., a suit to recover for damage to a metal building, which
rejected voluntary assumption of risk. The defective product was a component part of the
structures and, in spite of a jury finding that plaintiff voluntarily exposed the building to
the dangerous condition thus created, the court reasoned that the doctrine was inapplicable
to an immovable object, since the defective object was incapable of immediate removal.
" Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1972) (Apparent
production defect existed in front end suspension system of Oldsmobile which dealer and
independent garageman were unable to correct. Plaintiff's business required extensive use




court felt bound by McKee. Adam Dante again provided the court with an
opportunity to abandon the clumsy, baffling, unjust dichotomy of doctrine
including "no duty" and voluntary assumption of risk. While the procedural
reforms in the latter case should be of great assistance to the trial bar, greater
progress could have been made by removing "no duty," "open and obvious,"
and voluntary assumption of risk from the tort law of Texas."'
Short of outright abolition, several possible alternatives exist. Since the
supreme court has relied so heavily upon the Restatement position in the area,
two specific sections deserve comment.
Section 343A'0' makes it clear that if the possessor should anticipate harm
to plaintiff despite the plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous activity or ob-
viousness of the dangerous condition, such possessor has a continuing duty
over and above plaintiff's assumption of risk or failure to negate "no duty."
If defendant's anticipation of harm is supported by the pleading and proof,
plaintiff should be entitled to a special issue and prevail in the absence of
contributory negligence. One court of civil appeals attempted to utilize this
theory, but was reversed by the supreme court in a per curiam opinion that did
not indicate whether the point was properly before it for consideration." Until
the court holds that this section is not applicable or seriously curtails its
availability, it offers plaintiff some hope.
Section 496E(2)"1' is of more limited application but should render volun-
tary assumption of risk inapplicable when plaintiff is, for example, seeking
medical attention'" or on the premises as a member of defendant's club. 1'
Finally, assuming voluntary assumption of risk is a recognized defense, why
should not plaintiff be permitted a rebuttal issue on whether the defendant was
negligent in allowing plaintiff to assume the risk or encounter the dangerous
condition of which plaintiff had knowledge? To recognize such a theory of
10 An examination of the briefs before the court in Adam Dante indicates that plaintiff
did not urge the court to abandon all defenses except contributory negligence. However,
by the same token, neither party suggested that the Court use the case as an instrument of
approving the method of special issue submission set out in the opinion. Presumably, then,
the court could have suggested the abolition of all the defenses except contributory negligence
if it had chosen to do so.
1
0
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965) (emphasis added):
Known or Obvious Dangers
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness.
'o Greenwood v. Lowe Chem. Co., 428 S.W.2d 358, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.) 1968), rev'd per curiam, 433 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1968).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965):
Necessity of voluntary assumption
(2) The plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in
order to
(a) Avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) Exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has
no right to deprive him.
"'E.g., Gulfway Gen. Hosp. v. Pursley, 397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965),
error ref. n.r.e.
...Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972).
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defendant's negligence might enable a plaintiff to obtain relief in those in-
stances in which defendant has left him with no reasonable alternative.
The supreme court will hopefully repudiate and abandon voluntary assump-
tion of risk, including negation of "no duty," at its earliest opportunity. Recent
decisions indicate that it has faced similar challenges and is not reluctant, when
justice demands, to advance the state of tort law.112 Eight other jurisdictions
have recently either eliminated the defense or seriously limited its application.
Perhaps Texas will be next.
"' Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969) (strict liability in tort for
defective product extended to third parties); Morton v. Humber, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
1968) (implied warranty of fitness imposed on builder-vendor of homes); O.M. Franklin
Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967) (strict liability of seller
of defective product extended to consumer's property).
"'Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61 (Alas. 1968); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586
(Ky. 1967); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Bolduc v.
Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); McGrath v. American Cyanamid, 41 N.J.
271, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971);
Ritter v. Beals, 350 P.2d 1080 (Ore. 1961); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767
(Wash. 1962).
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